Kategori: Xinjiang 新疆

Yesterday morning (26 June) another tragic and violent incident happened in Xinjiang, this time in Lukqun township, Pichan (Shanshan) county, close to Turpan (新疆吐鲁番鄯善县鲁克沁镇). 27 people died, according to official sources 17 people (including nine policmen) killed by local ”knife-wielding mobs” (all Uyghur), and then the police shot and killed ten people from these mobs. The PRC state news agency Xinhua only published this news in a brief English statement. Nothing in any Chinese language media inside the PRC. Interestingly the People’s Daily affiliate Global Times later came with a longer piece, quoting reporting by the Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao (大公報)! Usually only Xinhua reporting is allowed, most likely meaning that Ta Kung Pao, a ”Beijing-friendly” newspaper (claimed to be party funded), was used to show the exception to the rule.

It is notable that the word terrorism was not used in the first official reports. Global Times, however, added this, and this has been the theme in most similar incidents. In late April this year there was another clash in Maralbexi (Bachu 巴楚) outside Kashgar (喀什噶尔 or 喀什) where 21 were killed, 15 of them policemen. This was claimed by authorities as ”planning for terrorist attacks”. Notably, in all recent incidents of this kind the perpetrators have been using large knives, not explosives or guns. The authorities never seem to consider it to be ”merely” criminal groups, without any political or terrorist goals. The incident yesterday might actually be related to an incident in a neighbouring village 9 April, where a young Uyghur boy was brutally killed by a Han Chinese man. Revenge by devastated relatives, spurred on by longtime frustration and inability to control and change one’s own situation?

One should perhaps not speculate, but certainly one must condemn such acts of violence. With the propaganda situation in China facts are always distorted, sometimes to the degree that one doesn’t know what to say or think. A friend made me aware of a Reuters report saying ”Xinjiang minorities too busy dancing to make trouble”, apparently a comment made by Xinjiang vice governor Shi Dagang (史大刚) 28 May. The original Chinese reporting reveals even more of his peculiar comments. Shi Dagang also claimed that ”there is always a mutual respect between our Han cadres and locals of all nationalities, and they are all good friends” (我们的汉族干部和当地的各民族之间相互非常尊重、相互都是好朋友). I still remember clearly my first visit to Xinjiang in 1998 where one of my hosts, a local Uyghur government cadre, had a Han driver and several Han subordinates. They were all courteous towards him during work time, but apparently they had never met after work hours, and they lived in separate compounds far away from each other.

Governor Shi also claims that ”every time we are guests in ethnic minority homes, we are treated with good meat and wine, they sing and dance; ethnic minorities are very simple and kind in such matters, generous and passionately hospitable” (我们到少数民族家里作客，好肉好酒的招待，跳着舞唱着歌，少数民族这种情感非常淳朴、非常善良、非常热情、非常大方，真的是热情好客). Who would not do his best to entertain a visiting governor?

Stereotypes about dancing, singing, friendliness and hospitality are merely one of many ways of controlling non-majority culture in the PRC. It is not enough to cause violent clashes, but is one of the factors underlying the ever growing tensions. Next week is the 4th anniversary of the ”5 July incident” 2009, where almost 200 people were killed in Urumqi (乌鲁木齐). This year it happens to come just before Ramadan (斋月), which starts 9 July.

Former Chongqing vice mayor and police chief Wang Lijun (王立军) was sentenced to fifteen years in prison yesterday for ”bending the law for selfish ends, defection, abuse of power and bribe-taking” (徇私枉法、叛逃、滥用职权、受贿). A detailed account of the trial was also published by the official news agency Xinhua. Without mentioning him by name, only by position, it was revealed during the trial that Bo Xilai had literally ear slapped Wang Lijun when he told Bo of his wife Gu Kailai’s alleged involvement in the killing of British businessman Neil Heywood. How will Bo Xilai be punsihed for that – or will he? Hopefully People’s Daily offspring Global Times is right when saying ”… justice will eventually trump over any privilege”.

Actually, Wang Lijun got several sentences of seven, nine and two years, that would combine to 20 years in prison, but he was instead given a total of fifteen years, and one year deprivation of political rights. It is likely that his revealing of facts around the Bo-Gu affair helped reduce his sentence.

Besides the bizarre setting of the whole case, it gives some perspective to Chinese criminal punishment. In 2009 Uyghur Christian Alimjan Yimit (阿里木江·依米提) was also sentenced to fifteen years in prison for ”illegally revealing state secrets to a foreigner” (向境外人员非法提供国家秘密). He had told his American friend of the pressure he received from the local religious affairs office. Is that a state secret? In 2010 Uyghur journalist Gheyret Niyaz (海莱提·尼亚孜) was also sentenced to fifteen years in prison for ”endangering state security” by talking to Asia Weekly (亞洲週刊).

Abuse of power is a central issue in all these three cases. Global Times writes also on this: ”Is such abuse of power by Wang [Lijun] an individual case, or is it typical?”. It seems typical to me.

In February I wrote about a teacher in Xinjiang who lost his bonus because he did not shave his beard off. Now beard control seems to have spread also to other areas. Yesterday a Yunnan friend (Han Chinese) with a nice goatee (山羊胡) told me that when he recently went to renew his ID card (身份证) he was told by the police that ”only special religious communities can take photos with beards” (留胡子拍照的只有特殊宗教群体)?! This was only mentioned in speaking, no written regulations were shown. Actually, the specification for photos used in second generation Chinese ID cards says nothing of beards.

My friend has grown his beard for some years and did not want to shave it off, and decided to take a photo without shaving. When bringing it back to the police station the staff told him that ”if the higher level leaders will approve then we will let it be, and if not you must come back and take another” (如果上级领导认可就算了，如果不认可要回来重拍).

Not everyone is as courageous as my friend, and Chinese web sites gives ample evidence that similar things happen around China. One may think that it is merely a matter of overzealous local police wanting young men to look proper with crew cut (平头) and without beard, but the comment to my friend says something else. Why mention ”special religious communities” at all? That comment is also in conflict with the incident with the Xinjiang teacher. He was a Uyghur Muslim, but could not keep his beard. Things are definitely getting worse when they want to control how people look and if they shave.

För någon vecka sen, mitt under det kinesiska nyåret, revs ett hus på Bei zongbu hutong 24 i Beijing (北总布胡同24号). Inget konstigt med det kan tyckas, det rivs hela tiden i Beijing och huset var redan skadat av tidigare rivningsförsök. Men plötsligt uppstod en proteststorm och till och med statliga nyhetsbyrån Xinhua skrev kritiskt. Under några år på 1930-talet bodde Kinas viktigaste arkitektpar Liang Sicheng 梁思成 och Lin Huiyin 林徽因 i huset och hade där sin mest kreativa period. Trots myndighetsbeslut för något år sen om att bevara och renovera byggnaden kunde ett fastighetsbolag ändå riva huset. Är detta ett tecken på svaghet hos myndigheterna? Eller beror det på bristande förståelse för eller insikt i opinionen? Är det ett tecken på svaghet hos regimen? Kanske är det ”bara” korruption. Frågan är inte helt okomplicerad. Frågan om bevarandet av Beijings gamla delar är inte enkel. Övergrepps har begåtts och begås fortfarande, människor blir rotlösa och mycket av karaktären i vissa kvarter och hela stadsdelar försvinner. Liksom Klarakvarteren i Stockholm kommer denna omvälvning att talas om länge framöver.

”Rivningsraseri” kan ha många bottnar. Det kan vara upprörda känslor mot orimliga rivningar och fysisk förstörelse. Men att protestera mot att kultur och traditioner raseras och rivs ner för att aldrig kunna byggas upp igen är också ett sorts ”rivningsraseri” och här är händelserna i Kashgar betydligt allvarligare. Vad är ”modernt” och vem får vara med och bestämma vad som behövs, vilken ”etnisk karaktär” som ska finnas och vilka uttryck den ska få ta sig?

Some thoughts about the tearing down of old buildings and entire city districts in China, and what it means to us; who decides and what is the result. How is culture and tradition torn down and who owns the process?

考虑一下中国“拆”现象、老建筑、全城市地区（北京、喀什）都全部被拆了。这种发展如何影响我们？谁作出决定？结果如何？文华和传统如何“拆掉”？谁拥有发展和现代化的进程？